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MORGAN v. ILLINOIS: AN ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE EQUALITY IN
THE SELECTION OF CAPITAL SENTENCING JURORS
I. INMODUCTION
Fundamental to the American criminal justice system is the princi-
ple that a criminal defendant has the right to be tried by a jury of his or
her peers.' This principle is most critical when a criminal defendant
stands accused of a capital crime.2 To protect capital defendants, many
states have instituted a two-phase criminal jury system: first, a trial
judge instructs the jury to determine the defendant's guilt or innocence;
and second, if the jury finds the defendant guilty, a trial judge instructs
the same jury to consider aggravating and mitigating factors to deter-
mine the appropriate sentence.3 In the sentencing phase, therefore, a
1. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, reh'g denied, 392 U.S.
947 (1968). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a crim-
inal defendant charged with a serious crime has a fundamental right to request a
jury trial. Id. Although it is conceivable to imagine a fair system without the jury
option, the Court stated that "no American State has undertaken to construct
such a system." Id. at 150 n.14. Rather, the Court recognized that the right to a
jury trial is so fundamental to our system that "every American State... uses the
jury extensively, and imposes very serious punishments only after a trial at which
the defendant has a right to a jury's verdict." Id.
Historically, the jury trial can be traced back several centuries before
America was founded. Id. at 151. Scholar Robert Lloyd Raskopf has noted that
"[s]ince its inception in England in the era before the Norman conquest, thejury
has played a central role in justice, politics, and government." Robert Lloyd
Raskopf, A First Amendment Right of Access to a Juror's Identity: Toward a Fuller Under-
standing of the Jury's Deliberative Process, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 357, 357-58 (1990). Ras-
kopf has indicated further that the jury's historical role as the safeguard of
criminal defendants' rights against "ruthless prosecutor[s]" and "corrupt
judge[s]" is legendary. Id.
The protection against arbitrary rule by sovereign powers was the major
objective in the creation of the Bill of Rights of 1789, which recognized trial by
jury in America. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151. For a further discussion of the histori-
cal right to a jury trial particularly in a capital sentencing case, see Mark S.
Brodin, Accuracy, Eficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process-The Case for the
Fact Verdict, 59 U. GIN. L. REV. 15, 15 (1990) (noting that jury is part of national
folklore protecting accused from arbitrary law enforcement and biased judiciary)
and John W. Poulos, Liability Rules, Sentencing Factors, and the Sixth Amendment Right
to a Jury Trial: A Preliminary Inquiry, 44 U. MIAMi L. REV. 643, 660-63 (1990)
("[T]he right to ajury trial removes from the government's arsenal the awesome
power to directly impose the criminal sanction on any citizen.").
2. See, e.g., Teresa A. Brown, Note, Who's Qualified to Decide Who Dies?, 65
NEB. L. REV. 559, 564-65 (1986) (noting that jury selection is most significant in
capital case because defendant's life is at stake). Once imposed, the death pen-
alty, unlike other punishments, is irreversible. Rick Seltzer et al., The Effect of
Death Qualification on the Propensity of Jurors to Convict: The Maryland Example, 29
How. LJ. 571, 576 (1986).
3. See, e.g., AL.A. CODE § 13A-5-46(b) (1982) ("If the defendant was tried
and convicted by a jury, the sentencing hearing shall be conducted before the
(1579)
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juror must consider factors beyond guilt to determine whether a capital
defendant should receive a sentence of death or life imprisonment. 4
The most pertinent aspect of this two-phase criminal trial is the
court's ability to determine whether a juror will impartially consider all
of the evidence presented. 5 The Sixth Amendment of the United States
same jury unless it is impossible or impracticable to do so."); CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 16-11-103 (1986) ("[S]entencing hearing shall be conducted by the trial judge
before the trial jury."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(b) (1987) ("Upon a con-
viction of guilt of a defendant of first-degree murder, the Superior Court shall
conduct a separate hearing ... this hearing shall be conducted by the trial judge
before (the same] jury."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (d) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1992) (stating that sentencing phase "shall be conducted before the jury that
determines the defendant's guilt. . . or before the court alone if the defendant
waives ajury for the separate proceeding"); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(I)(b)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990) ("In all cases in which the death penalty may be
imposed and which are tried by ajury, upon a return of a verdict of guilty by the
jury, the court shall resume the trial and conduct a presentence hearing... and
the jury shall retire to... recommend a sentence .... ."); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-
19-101(l) (1993) ("Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of
capital murder or other capital offense, the court shall conduct a separate sen-
tencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to
death or life imprisonment. The proceeding shall be conducted by the trial
judge before the trial jury .. ").
Other states leave the sentencing decision to the trial judge. See, e.g., ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703B (1989) ("When a defendant is found guilty of or
pleads guilty to first degree murder ... the judge who presided at the trial...
shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing... [and] [t]he hearing shall be con-
ducted before the court alone."); IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2515(d)-() (1987) ("In all
cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, the court shall, after convic-
tion ... (and] [u]pon making the prescribed findings, impose sentence within
the limits fixed by law."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (1993) ("When a de-
fendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to an offense for which the sentence of
death may be imposed, the judge who presided at the trial ... shall conduct a
separate sentencing hearing . .. [which] shall be conducted before the court
alone.").
One commentator has provided a compilation of the sentencing procedures
of all 36 states that permit the death penalty. See Seltzer et al., supra note 2, at
572 n.5. For a further discussion of which states permit the death penalty, see
infra note 66.
4. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-45(i-(g) (1982) (providing that court must
find at least one aggravating factor and no mitigating factors to impose death);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4209(d)(1)(a)-(b) (1987) (providing that death pen-
alty shall not be imposed unless aggravating factor exists and no sufficiently mit-
igating evidence exists); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (c) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1992) (providing that court shall instruct jury to consider any aggravating or
mitigating factors in determining appropriate sentence); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.025(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990) (providing that jury shall hear miti-
gating and aggravating evidence to determine appropriate sentence); Miss.
ODE ANN. §§ 99-19-101(3)(a)-(c) (1993) (providing that jury must determine
that aggravating circumstances exist and no sufficient mitigating circumstances
exist in order to impose death penalty).
5. See, e.g., Marshall Dayan et al., Searching For an Impartial Sentencer Through
Juiy Selection in Capital Trials, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 151, 151 (1989). Scholar
Dayan has noted that "jury selection is perhaps the most important stage of any
trial ...." Id. Specifically, to meet constitutional mandates, a juror must be
2
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Constitution requires that a defendant charged with a serious crime
have the opportunity to be tried by an impartial jury of his or her peers.6
State criminal defendants also are guaranteed this right of impartiality
because the Sixth Amendment is applied to state criminal proceedings
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 7
To ensure that a defendant receives his or her Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury, the prosecution, the defense and the trial
judge participate in the process of voir dire.8 Voir dire enables a trial
judge to question potential jurors to determine whether a particular ju-
ror's views would inhibit his or her ability to apply the law. 9 During voir
impartial in both the guilt and sentencing phase of the trial. Id at 152. Dayan
has recognized further that the defense counsel's task of empaneling an impar-
tial jury in a capital case is extremely difficult because defendants are often ac-
cused of extremely brutal and revolting crimes. Id. at 151 (noting brutality of
crime and overwhelming societal support for death penalty make empaneling
impartial jury "difficult, if not impossible").
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury." Id. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct.2720 (199 1),Justice Kennedy opined that "[flew, if any, interests under the con-
stitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by impartial jurors.Id. a  2745. Determi ing how to protect this interest, however, is often difficult
because it requires that defense counsel assess a prospective jurors' beliefs andiases, and these biases are often articulated or hidden.
Scholar Dayan has suggested several guidelines for selecting an impartial
capital sentencing jury. Dayan et al., supra note 5, at 152. For example, Dayanhas asserted that a juror may not be impartial if he or she harbors misconcep-
tions concerning the ability of life sentenced inmates to receive parole becausehis or her belief may alter the determination of an appropriate sentence. Id. at
175-76. Dayan has also suggested that counsel should inform jurors as to the
effect of their decision to impose a life sentence-for example, whether defend-
ant would ever be eligible for parole. Id. at 175. Additionally, Dayan has as-serted that "a capital defendant may not be sentenced to death by persons
unable to conscientiously consider mitigating evidence 'stemming from the di-
verse frailties of humankind' offered by the defendant as a reason not to sen-
tence him to death." Id. at 176 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 304 (1976)).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in per-tinent part, that "[n]o State... shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law. Id. For a discussion of the Sixth Amendment's
application to state proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra
notes 31-51 and accompanying text.8. See Raskopf, supra note t, a  357 (noting that jury's role is to protect
defendant against "wrath of ruthless prosecutor and the tyranny of the corrupt
judge"). Arguably, any attempts by ajudge or prosecutor to eliminate impartialjurors through manipulation of the voir dire process would directly contravene
the historical purpose of the American jury system to protect defendants and to
reinforce the democratic political framework. Id. In fact, Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, asserted that "[t]he constitutional right
to an impartial jury is so basic to a fair trial that its infraction can never betreated as harmless error." Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 649 (1986).
9. See Otto G. Obermaier, Litigation and Administrative Practice Course Hand-
book Series Litigation-The Jury 1987: Techniques for theTrial Lawyer-Judge Conducted
Voir Dire, 340 P.L.I. 151, 151 (1987) (defining voir dire as "the preliminary ex-
1993] NOTE. 1581
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dire, counsel may request that a trial judge question a potential juror
about his or her views on such subjects as racial prejudice and capital
punishment.10 Depending on a juror's responses to the questions
posed, he or she will be accepted, challenged for cause and excused, or
dismissed from serving as a juror in the case by the prosecution or de-
fense's peremptory challenge."1 A trial judge often will excuse a juror
amination of venireman, or prospective jurors"). Traditionally, the trial judge
rather than the prosecutor or the defense counsel conducts the voir dire of po-
tential jurors. Id.; see also People v. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d 1171, 1184-85 (Ill. 1984)
(indicating that trial judge conducts voir dire of potential jurors), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1037 (1985). Obermaier has suggested that it is anomalous for the trial
judge to conduct voir dire because, in actuality, he or she knows very little about
the case at hand. See Obermaier, supra, at 151. But see Michael T. Nietzel & Ron-
ald C. Dillehay, The Effects of Variations in Voir Dire Procedures in Capital Murder Tri-
als, 6 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 3 (1982) (maintaining that attorney conducted voir
dire in state courts is gradually eroding due to judiciary and bar criticisms that it
is "inefficient, time-consuming, and sometimes improper") (citing People v.
Crowe, 506 P.2d 193, 199-200 (Cal. 1973)). Nonetheless, statistics show that
even in jurisdictions that permit the lawyers to conduct voir dire-New York,
Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida-the majority of
those jurisdictions still conduct voir dire without much emphasis on lawyer par-
ticipation. Id.
One advantage to judge conducted voir dire is that the judge theoretically
has no interest in the outcome of the case, and therefore, is more likely to pose
questions that would benefit both the prosecution and the defense in their at-
tempt to empanel impartial jurors. However, as Obermaier has suggested,
knowing little about the case at hand may hamper the trial judge's ability to
sufficiently question potentialjurors. Obermaier, supra, at 151. Because the trial
judge is not aware of the specific nuances of the case, the judge cannot be fully
expected to ask questions that would uncover potential relevant biases that may
affect a juror's deliberations. Id
If voir dire is a protective device, the court must permit liberal questioning
by either the trial judge or the attorneys so that each individual defendant is
guaranteed a truly impartial jury. Dayan et al., supra note 5, at 165 (asserting
that "counsel should be accorded wide latitude in examining prospective jurors
especially in capital cases"). This liberal questioning, particularly when it is
done by attorneys, may, as Nietzel has suggested, be "time-consuming" and
sometimes "inefficient," but it is the best procedure to ensure an impartial jury.
See Nietzel & Dillehay, supra, at 3.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize the federal district
courts to conduct voir dire and permit attorneys either to supplement these
questions directly, or more commonly, to submit a list of supplementary ques-
tions for the federal judge to pose to the prospective panel of jurors. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 24(a). For a further discussion of variations in the voir dire process, see
Nietzel & Dillehay, supra, at 2.
10. See, e.g., Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931). The Supreme
Court in Aldridge permitted defense counsel to question potential jurors con-
cerning racial prejudice to determine impartiality. Id. at 314-15. For a discus-
sion of the facts and significance of the Aldridge decision, see infra notes 59-65
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the ability of defense counsel to
inquire into a juror's views on capital punishment, see infra notes 66-130 and
accompanying text.
11. See Jefferson E. Howeth, Note, Holland v. Illinois: The Supreme Court
Narrows the Scope of Protection Against Discriminatory Jury Selection Procedures, 48
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 579, 581 (1991). The prosecution and defense both have
4
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based on the fact that the juror's views are incompatible with the man-
dates of the law.1 2 For example, to protect a defendant's Sixth Amend-
an unlimited number of challenges for cause that they may utilize whenever a
juror evinces an actual or implied bias. Id. In addition, the prosecution and the
defense may assert a limited number of peremptory challenges without stating
the basis of the challenge. Id. Scholar Dayan has noted that a party's challenges
of prospective jurors, either for cause or peremptory, may well be the most efec-
tive way to ferret out latent prejudices in potentialjurors. Dayan et al., supra note
5, at 165. The Supreme Court, however, has held that the trial court may deny
completely the right to a peremptory challenge without violating the constitu-
tional guarantee of an impartial jury. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348,
2357 (1992) (noting that peremptory challenges are not constitutionally pro-
tected rights, "but one state created means to the constitutional end of an im-
partial jury and a fair trial").
12. See, e.g., Seltzer et al., supra note 2, at 574. In a capital trial, the trial
court questions a juror about his or her attitudes toward the death penalty and
his or her ability to impose the death penalty, if warranted. Id. at 574. In a
capital trial, this process is called "death qualification," indicating that ajuror is
only qualified if his or her answers to the questions posed establish an ability to
consider the death penalty as an appropriate punishment. Id. If a juror evinces
an inability even to consider the death penalty, the trial court must exclude that
juror for cause from both the guilt and the sentencing phases of the trial. Id.
Death qualification is controversial because it results in the removal of po-
tential capital jurors solely because they refuse to impose the death penalty. See
William C. Thompson, Death Qualification After Wainwright v. Witt and Lockhart
v. McCree, 13 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 185, 185 (1989). Thompson has noted thatjurors excluded by this process are qualified to decide guilt and innocence; they
are only unsuitable for the sentencing phase. Id. Thus, in capital trials, a crimi-
nal defendant's guilt or innocence is decided "exclusively by jurors who have
stated a willingness to impose a death sentence." Id. Many critics suggest that
death qualified jurors are conviction prone. Id.; Seltzer et al., supra note 2, at
573 (stating that "death qualification process produces a jury that is biased in
favor of the prosecution, unduly prone to convict on the issue of guilt or inno-
cence, and underrepresentative of the community in which it is drawn"); see also
James Luginbuhl & Kathi Middendorf, Death Penalty Beliefs and Jurors' Responses to
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 12 LAw & HUM. BEAV.
263, 276 (1988) (arguing that death qualifiedjurors are more "authoritarian and
punitive," and as a result "these [findings] suggest that death-qualified jurors
would be more conviction prone than death-scrupled jurors"). But see Wither-
spoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 898 (1968). In Witherspoon,
the United States Supreme Court held that insufficient scientific evidence ex-
isted to conclude that exclusion ofjurors opposed to capital punishment would
"substantially increase[] the risk of conviction." Id. at 518. In Witherspoon, a
death qualified jury sentenced the defendant to death, and on appeal, the de-
fendant cited two surveys that concluded that a death qualified juror is more
conviction prone than a jury on which objectors to the death penalty are em-
paneled. Id. at 517 n.10. The Court held that the data was "too tentative and
fragmentary" to establish that death qualified jurors were conviction prone. Id.
Eighteen years later, the Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed its rejection of
the studies produced in Witherspoon. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 170
(1986). In Lockhart, the Court stated: "It goes almost without saying that if
these studies were 'too tentative and fragmentary' to make out a claim of consti-
tutional error in 1968, the same studies, unchanged but for having aged some 18
years, are still insufficient to make out such a claim in this case." Id.; see alsoJoan
B. Foley, Comment, Death Qualification: Are Capital Defendants Entitled to Acquittal-
Prone Juries? An Argument in Support of the Status Quo, 30 ST. Louis U. LJ. 193, 225
5
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ment right to an impartial jury, a trial judge must excuse a juror who
indicates during voir dire that he or she is unable to remain impartial.13
A commonly appealed issue in capital cases is the trial court's re-
fusal to permit defense counsel to determine a juror's views on capital
punishment during voir dire.14 Convicted defendants often will allege
that such refusal allowed individuals who were biased in favor of the
death penalty to serve as members of the jury, thus violating the defend-
ant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. 15 State courts had
vacillated between whether this refusal did, in fact, constitute a Sixth
Amendment violation.1 6 Morgan v. Illinois,17 a 1992 Supreme Court de-
(1985) (concluding that death qualification does not result in guilt prone or un-
derrepresentative jury).
For an in-depth discussion of the various types of studies undertaken to
determine whether death qualification led to conviction prone juries and several
courts criticisms of those studies, see Thompson, supra, at 191-93 (examining
courts repeated criticisms of empirical studies on death qualification) and Seltzer
et al., supra note 2 at 576-81 (examining sophistication and results of twelve
studies concluding that death qualification leads to conviction prone juries).
13. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150, reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 947(1968) (stating that defendant has right to trial by jury); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717, 728 (1961) (stating that juror must be impartial). For a discussion of the
requirement that ajuror in a criminal trial be impartial, see infra notes 31-51 and
accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., People v.Jackson, 582 N.E.2d 125, 131 (Ill. 1991) (refusing to
overturn defendant's death sentence where trial court failed to question pro-
spectivejurors as to whether they would automatically vote for death penalty);
Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 725 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990) (same), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 2840 (1991), and abrogated by Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992).
But see Skipper v. State, 364 S.E.2d 835, 839 (Ga. 1988) (overturning death pen-
alty sentence because trial court's limitation on voir dire deprived defendant of
opportunity to determine juror impartiality); Patterson v. Commonwealth, 283
S.E.2d 212, 214-15 (Va. 1981) (overturning defendant's death sentence where
trial judge refused to ask prospective jurors: "Do you believe that the death pen-
alty is ordinarily the proper punishment for the crime of capital murder?") (su-
perseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Evans v. Commonwealth, 323
S.E.2d 114, 117 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1025 (1985)).
15. See, e.g., Skipper, 364 S.E.2d at 839. In Skipper, the trial court had refused
to permit questioning of prospective jurors regarding their ability to consider
punishments other than death if the defendant was convicted. Id The trial
court stated that "no question's [sic] proper to ask a juror touching his feelings
on the imposition of the death penalty." Id. The Supreme Court of Georgia
rejected the trial court's reasoning, holding that:
"[A] criminal defendant is entitled to an impartial jury by the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. A juror who has made up his
mind prior to trial that he will not weigh evidence in mitigation is not
impartial .... ." In other words, "an inability to fairly consider a life
sentence is just as disqualifying as an inability to consider a death
sentence."
Id. (quoting Childs v. State, 357 S.E.2d 48, 48 (Ga. 1987)).
16. For a discussion of the varying approaches taken by state courts, see
infra notes 105-28 and accompanying text.
17. 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992). For an in-depth discussion of the Morgan deci-
sion, see infra notes 131-218 and accompanying text.
1584
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cision, attempted to reconcile this divergence.
In Morgan, the state charged the defendant Derrick Morgan with
first-degree murder.' 8 Subsequent to conviction, the trial court in-
structed the same jury to consider both aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors to determine an appropriate sentence. 19 The jury returned a death
sentence. 20 On appeal, the defendant alleged that the trial court's re-
fusal to ask jurors if they would automatically impose a death sentence
upon conviction violated his right to an impartial jury.2 1 In a 6-3 deci-
sion, the United States Supreme Court held that the trial court had vio-
lated the defendant's right to an impartialjury. 22 The Court opined that
the trial court's refusal effectively denied the defendant an opportunity
to determine whether a juror's partiality toward the death penalty man-
18. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2226.
19. Id. Illinois Criminal Law requires that the same jury that convicted the
defendant determine the appropriate sentence. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para.9-
1(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992). Once the jury convicts the defendant, the trial
court presents the same jury with both aggravating and mitigating factors that
they must "consider" to determine the appropriate sentence. Id. para.9-1 (c).
The Illinois Criminal Code lists eleven aggravating factors that would support ajury's decision to impose a death sentence. Id. para.9-1(b)(1)-(11). One such
aggravating factor is murder by a preconceived plan. Id. para.9-1 (b)(10). An-
other aggravating factor is murder that was committed pursuant to a contract,
agreement or understanding whereby the defendant was to receive money or
any item of value. Id. para.9- 1(b)(5).
After the prosecution has presented evidence of aggravating factors, the de-
fense has the opportunity to present mitigating factors that would support ren-
dering a life sentence rather than a death sentence. Id. para.9-1(c). Although
the Illinois statute lists several mitigating factors, the statute indicates that these
factors are not exclusive and that the defense may present other evidence of
mitigation, if relevant. Id Examples of mitigating factors include lack of a prior
criminal record, evidence that the defendant was under extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance, and evidence that the defendant acted under threat of immi-
nent infliction of death or great bodily harm. Id. para.9-1(c)(1)-(4).
The Supreme Court also has helped to define what mitigating factors a jury
may consider. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), the Supreme Court
stated that a jury may consider the defendant's character and record, as well as
the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. Id. at 604. For a
detailed discussion of the role of aggravating factors in both the guilt and sen-
tencing phase of a trial, see Poulos, supra note 1, at 665. Poulos has indicated
that aggravating factors "function to create liability for the death penalty" be-
cause a jury may not impose the death penalty unless it determines that an ag-
gravating factor indeed exists. Id. at 652.
20. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2226.
21. Id. at 2228. The Illinois trial court agreed with other jurisdictions that
have held that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury did not
entitle him or her to ask jurors whether they would automatically impose a sen-
tence o" death upon conviction. Id.
22. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). For
a discussion of the Sixth Amendment's applicability to a state criminal proceed-
ing, see infra notes 31-51 and accompanying text.
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dated excusal for cause.28 To ensure impartiality, the Morgan Court ar-
ticulated a bright line rule for capital cases: pursuant to defense
counsel's request, a capital trial judge must ask prospective jurors if their
views would compel them automatically to impose the death penalty
upon conviction.2 4 In so holding, the Court emphasized the critical role
that voir dire plays in ensuring that a criminal defendant receives his or
her right to an impartial jury.2 5
Section II of this Note addresses the Sixth Amendment guarantee
of an impartial jury.2 6 Subsequently, this section addresses the voir dire
process in a capital trial, focusing on the different approaches state
courts have taken to ensure that a defendant receives a fair and impartial
hearing.2 7 Section III of this Note analyzes the Morgan majority's strict
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment impartiality requirement.2 8 Sec-
tion IV of this Note concludes that the Morgan holding properly grants a
criminal defendant the opportunity to exclude prospective jurors who
are partial. 2 9 This Note further concludes that the effect of Morgan is to
put the state and the defendant on almost equal footing by ensuring an
impartial hearing for both litigants.3 0
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Sixth Amendment's Application to State Criminal Proceedings
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that a criminal defendant has the right to be tried by an impartial jury of
his or her peers.31 Originally, the Sixth Amendment applied only to
23. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229.
24. Id. at 2230. The Court held that "[i]f even one such juror [who would
automatically impose the death penalty] is empaneled and the death sentence is
imposed, the state is disentitled to execute the sentence." Id.
25. Id. at 2228. For a discussion of the Morgan Court's treatment of the
defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury, see infra notes 142-57 and
accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the constitutional guarantees afforded to a criminal
defendant under the Sixth Amendment and applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, see infra notes 31-51 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the voir dire process in a capital trial and the differ-
ent approaches that state courts have taken to ensure that a defendant receives a
fair and impartial hearing, see infra notes 105-28 and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the majority's strict adherence to the impartiality
requirement of the Sixth Amendment, see infra notes 142-46 and accompanying
text.
29. For a discussion of this Note's conclusion that the Morgan holding right-
fully grants a criminal defendant the opportunity to exclude jurors who are not
impartial, see infra notes 177-204 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of this Note's conclusion that the Morgan decision puts
the state and the defendant on an almost equal footing and ensures impartiality,
see infra notes 177-204 and accompanying text.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1586 [Vol. 38: p. 1579
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 5 [1993], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss5/5
1993] NoTE 1587
proceedings in federal court.3 2 However, by the mid-Twentieth Cen-
tury, the Sixth Amendment applied to state criminal cases through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Two Supreme Court cases, Duncan v. Louisi-
ana3 4 and Irvin v. Dowd,3 5 established the now universal proposition that
a state criminal defendant is entitled to the same rights as a defendant
tried in a federal court.
3 6
In Duncan, the Supreme Court faced the novel issue of whether a
state criminal defendant had a constitutional right to ajury trial. s 7 The
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a trial by
jury should apply to state criminal proceedings through the Fourteenth
32. See, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 556 (1952) (stating that obvi-
ous design of Bill of Rights was to protect individuals from governmental op-
pression and to guarantee Americans greater freedom than that of their
ancestors in Europe). The Framers originally added the Bill of Rights to the
Constitution to protect the federal government from infringing upon the rights
of American citizens. See KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
CASES AND MATERIALS 93 (1991). Historians have noted that the Anti-Federalists
objected to the Constitution because it contained few guarantees for personal
liberty from federal oppression. Id. In order to ensure ratification of the Con-
stitution, the Federalists had to promise the proposal of amendments-the Bill
of Rights-to the original constitution. Id. Early in American history, the threat
of the federal government usurping power from the states and American citizens
was imminently more feared than the threat of the states infringing on individual
rights. Id. America had recently broken away from an English monarchy that,
like a national government, had limited individual's sovereignty. Id. Thus, it is
not surprising that the Bill of Rights, as originally contemplated, did not apply
to the states. See id
33. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968). By
the mid-Twentieth Century, many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight
amendments of the Constitution had been held applicable to the States by virtue
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 148. For exam-
ple, the Due Process Clause now mandates that individuals receive compensa-
tion for property taken by the state. Chicago, B & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 238-39 (1897). The rights of free speech, press and religion, which are
protected by the First Amendment are now applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-87 (1927). In addi-
tion, the state may not infringe on an individual's Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and must exclude from state
prosecutions evidence illegally seized. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57
(1961). The state also may not deprive an individual of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-41 (1963). The
Constitution also guarantees a state criminal defendant the Fifth Amendment
right to refrain from self-incrimination. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
Prior to the Duncan decision, those states that did permit a state criminal
defendant to have ajury had to ensure juror impartiality. See Dayan et al., supra
note 5, at 152 ("[E]ven before the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment were
incorporated to govern state prosecutions, the Due Process Clause was held to
require an impartial jury in a state criminal prosecution.").
34. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
35. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
36. See Seltzer et al., supra note 2, at 572 ("It is constitutionally required
that a jury empaneled to sit on a capital case be both fair and impartial and
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.").
37. 391 U.S. 145 (1965).
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Amendment. 8 The Court reasoned that a state criminal defendant
charged with a serious crime has a fundamental right embodied in the
"American scheme ofjustice" to a trial byjury.3 9 The Court stated that
in order to determine the seriousness of a crime, a court must look to
the potential penalties for the crime, most notably, whether a prison
term was available.40 In Duncan, the Court held that a sixty-day prison
term was sufficiently serious to warrant the application of the Sixth
Amendment protection of trial by jury to a state criminal proceeding.4 1
Notably, this decision furthered the historical policy of protecting indi-
viduals from state oppression by requiring a jury of the defendant's
peers to determine his or her guilt.4 2
While the Duncan Court held that state criminal defendants are enti-
tled to ajury trial, it failed to define the requisite qualifications of a pro-
spective juror.43 The 1961 United States Supreme Court decision in
38. Id at 149. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part,
that "[n]o State... shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Supreme Court has held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes many of the
rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments to the Constitution. Duncan,
391 U.S. at 148. For a discussion of the Court's application of many of the rights
found in the Bill of Rights to state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment,
see supra note 33.
39. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148.
40. Id. at 161-62. To reach this conclusion, the Court relied on one of its
previous decisions that had counseled that "the penalty authorized for a particu-
ar crime is of major relevance in determining whether it is serious or not and
may in itself, if severe enough, subject the trial to the mandates of the Sixth
Amendment." Id. at 159 (citing District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617
(1937)).
41. Id. at 146. The trial court convicted the defendant of simple battery,
sentenced him to a sixty day prison term and fined him $150.00. Id.
42. Id. at 156. The Court stated:
Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience
that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges
brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the
voice of higher authority. The framers of the constitutions strove to
create an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection
against arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the right to be tried
by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased or
eccentric judge.
Id.
Commentators and historians on the subject of trial by jury have recognized
that a trial by jury protects defendants from state oppression. See, e.g., 4 WIL-
LIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349 (Cooley ed.
1899) (commenting that jury trial provides barrier between individual liberty
and prerogative of crown); Poulos, supra note 1, at 660 (stating that jury trial
removes power to impose criminal sanctions from government and places it in
"an ad hoc body of citizens who are bound only to the law and to the search for
truth").
43. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157-58.
1588 [Vol. 38: p. 1579
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Irvin v. Dowd4 4 complemented the Duncan decision, holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandated that any jury
empaneled in a state court must be impartial.4 5 In Irvin, three-fourths of
the jury empaneled to hear the defendant's case had admitted during
voir dire that they believed that the defendant was guilty. 4 6 These ad-
missions revealed the jurors' partiality.4 7 Accordingly, the Court va-
cated the sentencing judgment as violative of the defendant's due
process rights.48
Until Duncan and Irvin, the Supreme Court had failed to recognize
the constitutional guarantee of a trial by an impartial jury.4 9 Though a
rather recent concept, the courts now embrace this protection as "fun-
damental" to the American criminal justice system.50 This protection,
however, has posed serious problems for trial courts seeking to find the
elusive answers to the questions of who is an impartial juror and how to
determine this impartiality. 5 1
44. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
45. Id. Tracing the origin of the right to trial by jury, the Court stated "[i]n
essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by
a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair
hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process." Id.
46. Id. at 729.
47. Id. at 727. In Irvin, the petitioner was accused of six highly publicized
murders. Id. Of the twelve jurors who ultimately were empaneled, eight admit-
ted during voir dire that they believed the defendant was guilty. Id. Despite thejurors' admissions, the trial court refused to grant a change of venue to elimi-
nate such bias. Id The Supreme Court subsequently vacated the judgment and
remanded the case for retrial by a fair jury. Id. at 729.
48. Id. at 722.
49. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968);
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
50. See Seltzer et al., supra note 2, at 572 ("It is constitutionally required
that a jury empaneled to sit on a capital case be both fair and impartial.").
51. See, e.g., Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1250
(1988) (finding that failure of trial court to remove biased juror where defendant
exercised peremptory challenge did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to impartial jury); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (finding
that failure of trial court to ask questions concerning jurors' racial prejudice de-
nied defendant fair trial under Fourteenth Amendment); Turner v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 466 (1965) (finding that trial court denied defendant impartial jury
where key witnesses had repeated contact with jurors); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717 (1961) (finding that failure to grant change of venue violated defendant's
right to impartialjury where eight empaneledjurors admitted belief that defend-
ant was guilty); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 133 (1955) (finding that trial
court's refusal to grant change of venue in misdemeanor trial violated defend-
ant's right to impartial jury); State v. Williams, 550 A.2d 1172 (NJ. 1988) (find-
ing that trial court's failure to ask whether juror would automatically impose
death penalty violated defendant's right to impartial jury); Skipper v. State, 364
S.E.2d 835 (Ga. 1988) (finding that trial court's limitation on voir dire question-
ing deprived defendant of opportunity to determine juror's impartiality).
For a further discussion of the serious problems trial courts face when at-
tempting to determine who is an impartial juror and to how define this imparti-
ality, see infra notes 66-128 and accompanying text.
1993] NOTE 1589
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B. Voir Dire As a Means To Determine Impartiality
The most critical moments in a criminal trial often occur before the
presentation of opening arguments.5 2 For example, the voir dire proce-
dure, which precedes trial, serves the paramount function of empaneling
a fair and impartial jury as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.5 3
The definition of "voir dire" helps to illustrate its purpose in the
criminal justice system. Its translation is: "to speak the truth."5 4
Through tailored voir dire questioning, judges and trial lawyers attempt
to persuade prospective jurors to "speak the truth" when answering the
trial judge's questions. 55 Voir dire enhances both a trial judge's and a
lawyer's ability to ascertain the impartiality of a particular juror.56
Trial judges and lawyers have historically utilized voir dire to deter-
mine ajuror's impartiality concerning specific social issues.5 7 For exam-
ple, trial judges and lawyers use voir dire to determine whether a
potential juror possesses any racial prejudice that would influence his or
her decision to convict. 58 In Aldridge v. United States,59 the Supreme
Court addressed the propriety of such questioning in a capital case.60 In
Aldridge, the defendant was an African-American who had been accused
of killing a caucasian police officer.6 1 The Court held that the defense
52. See, e.g., Dayan et al., supra note 5, at 151. Dayan has asserted that jury
selection is the most important stage of any trial, especially where the jury will
have to decide whether the state should impose the death penalty. Id.
53. For a discussion of the procedure of voir dire and its potential over-
reaching effect in a capital trial, see supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
54. See Obermaier, supra note 9, at 151. Obermaier has indicated that the
term "voir dire" has come to signify "the preliminary examination of someone
asked to be a witness or ajuror." Id. It is important to distinguish between voir
dire of a potential juror and voir dire of a potential witness. Id. For example,
trial lawyers traditionally conduct the voir dire of witnesses. Id. In contrast, the
trial judge, with some assistance by the trial lawyers, generally conducts the voir
dire of prospective jurors. Id. For a discussion of the voir dire procedure in a
capital trial, see supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
55. For a discussion of the use of voir dire to determine a potential juror's
beliefs, see Obermaier, supra note 9, at 151.
56. Id An effective voir dire enables counsel on both sides to effectively
challenge for cause those jurors who show an actual or implied bias against their
client. See Howeth, Note, supra note 11, at 579-81 (explaining counsel's chal-
lenge for cause and use of peremptory challenge to ensure jury impartiality).
57. For a detailed discussion of the use of voir dire to determine impartial-
ity, see infra notes 58-128 and accompanying text.
58. See Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 309 (1931).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 310. Defense counsel raised the issue of juror impartiality. Id.
The defense counsel stated that "[a]t the last trial of this case I understand there
was one woman on the jury who was a southerner, and who said that the fact that
the defendant was a negro and the deceased a white man perhaps somewhat
influenced her." Id. Despite defense counsel's request, the trial judge refused
to question jurors about their racial prejudice. Id.
61. Id. at 309.
1590 [Vol. 38: p. 1579
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counselor had a right to request that the trial judge voir dire jurors to
determine racial animus.6 2 The Court reasoned that the trial judge
should have allowed the question because no harm could have resulted
from the question and a great benefit-protecting the defendant's con-
stitutional rights-could have resulted. 63 By permitting inquiry con-
cerning racial prejudice, the Court mandated that trial courts were to err
on the side of protecting the defendant's constitutional right to an im-
partial jury.64 The Aldridge decision is significant today because it set
62. Id. at 314. The Court indicated that such inquiry was appropriate when
the defendant was accused of an offense against a victim of a race other than his
own. Id.
63. The Aidridge Court defined the issue as follows:
The question is not as to ... civil privileges ... but as to the bias of the
particular jurors who are to try the accused. If in fact, sharing the gen-
eral sentiment, they were found to be impartial, no harm would be
done in permitting the question [as to racial prejudice]; but if any one
of them was shown to entertain a prejudice which would preclude his
rendering a fair verdict, a gross injustice would be perpetrated in al-
lowing him to sit .... [W]e do not think that it can be said that the
possibility of such prejudice is so remote as to justify the risk in forbid-
ding this inquiry. And this risk becomes most grave when the issue is
life or death.
Id.
64. Id. The Court considered it of paramount importance that the risk of
failing to ask the question significantly outweighed the harm in permitting the
question to be asked because the defendant was on trial for his life. Id.
In contrast, in Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976), the Supreme Court
held that failure to conduct voir dire regarding racial prejudice was not per se a
violation of defendant's constitutional rights. Id. at 598. In Ristaino, the defend-
ant was charged with armed robbery and with assault and battery with intent to
murder. Id. at 590. The trial court convicted defendant of all counts. d. at 593.
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court addressed two issues: first,
whether the respondent was entitled to require a question to be directed specifi-
cally at a juror concerning his or her racial prejudice; and second, whether the
trial court must always ask such a question where a trial involves a defendant of
one race and a victim of another. Id. at 590. The Court answered both these
issues in the negative. Id.
The Ristaino Court may have been influenced by the fact that the case did
not involve the death penalty. The Court stated: "We do not agree.., that the
need to question veniremen specifically about racial prejudice also rose to con-
stitutional dimensions in this case." Id. at 597. The Ristaino Court held that the
recent decision in Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973), which required
questioning jurors concerning their racial prejudices, merely "reflected an as-
sessment of whether under all of the circumstances presented there was a consti-
tutionally significant likelihood that, absent questioning about racial prejudice,
the jurors would not be as 'indifferent as [they stand] unsworne.'" Ristaino, 424
U.S. at 596 (quoting CoKE ON LI-rLETON 144b (19th ed. 1832)).
The significance of the Ristaino decision lies not only in the Court's refusal
to mandate a constitutional guarantee of questioning potential jurors concern-
ing their racial prejudice, but also in the judicial deference granted to the trial
judge. Id. The Court stated that the trial court must make an "assessment" of
"all the circumstances presented" to determine whether ajuror would be "indif-
ferent as [he] stands unsworne." Id. This subjective assessment has remained
the standard in all appeals raising the issue of bias where the trial judge has
refused to question jurors as to their personal views. See State v. Atkins, 399
13
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precedent for permitting the questioning ofjurors about their individual
biases to determine impartiality.6 5
C. The Quest for Impartiality in a Capital Sentencing Hearing
Juror bias is not only at issue where race is concerned, but also in
capital cases because of the severity of the possible punishment and be-
cause of increasing support for the death penalty.6 6 In capital cases,
both the defense and the prosecution have a strong interest in obtaining
an impartial jury.67 Frequently, because the defendant has the most at
S.E.2d 760, 765 (S.C. 1990) ("The determination of whether a juror is qualified
to serve on a death penalty case is within the sole discretion of the trial judge
and is not reviewable on appeal unless wholly unsupported by the evidence."
(quoting State v. Plemmons, 332 S.E.2d 765, 769 (S.C. 1985), vacated on other
grounds, 476 U.S. 1102 (1986), and overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence,
406 S.E.2d 315 (1988)).
For a further discussion of the effects and problems posed by the great lati-
tude and judicial deference accorded trial judges, see infra notes 87-92 and ac-
companying text.
65. Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 314. In a footnote, the Court noted that:
"[p]rejudice being a state of mind more frequently founded in passion
than in reason, may exist with or without cause; and to ask a person
whether he is prejudiced or not against a party, and (if the answer is
affirmative), whether that prejudice is of such a character as would lead
him to deny the party a fair trial, is not only the simplest method of
ascertaining the state of his mind, but is, probably, the only sure
method of fathoming his thoughts and feelings."
Id. at 313-14 n.3 (quoting People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347, 350 (1855)).
66. See Seltzer et al., supra note 2, at 571-72. Seltzer has noted that capital
punishment has become a "routine" sanction imposed in the American criminal
justice system. Id. There are currently 36 states that permit capital punishment,
and since 1976, 85 men and one woman have been executed. Id. (citing NAACP
LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (AUGUST, 1986)).
The following states permit capital punishment: See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40
(1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703A (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-10-
101(a)-(b) (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1988); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-11-103 (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(b) (1987); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 775.082(1) (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(a)-(b) (1990 & Supp.
1993); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(c)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (West 1986); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-
567 (West 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 71 (1957); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-
101 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.006 (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301(1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.355
(Michie 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.5IV (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:II -
3 (West 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-1 (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-2000(a)(1) (Michie 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(B) (Anderson
1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.9A (West 1983); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.105(1)(a) (1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 9711(a)(1) (1989); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 24-3-510 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-27A-4(1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202 (1991); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 37.071 (West 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-206(1) (1993); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 7101 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1950); WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.95.080 (1990); and Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-101(b) (1977).
67. Dayan et al., supra note 5, at 151. Scholar Dayan has noted that capital
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stake-his or her life-defense counsel is more aggressively litigating
and appealing alleged mistakes in voir dire.68 This aggressive litigation
by defense counsel has led to a plethora of appellate capital cases alleg-
ing constitutionally insufficient voir dire.69
1. Witherspoon v. Illinois and Its Progeny
In Witherspoon v. Illinois,70 the Supreme Court defined the extent to
which a prosecutor may excuse for cause a juror who is allegedly partial to
the defense. 71 In Witherspoon, the trial court had excused all jurors who
expressed "conscientious or religious scruples" against capital punish-
ment, as well as all jurors who opposed capital punishment in princi-
ple.72 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court balanced the
defendant's interest in an impartial jury against the prosecution's inter-
est in securing a capital sentence.73 After balancing these competing
cases often involve heinous crimes where the "defendant's guilt is virtually unas-
sailable." Id. The function of the jury in this instance is to recommend the ap-
propriate sentence. Id. In these instances, defense lawyers have the difficult task
of selecting "qualified and competent jurors who are [nevertheless] willing to
sentence their clients to death." Id.
68. For a discussion of several cases appealed due to alleged mistakes in
voir dire, see infra notes 70-124 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 582 N.E.2d 125, 156 (111. 1991) (affirming
defendant's sentence and rejecting argument that voir dire deprived defendant
of constitutional right to impartial jury); People v. Gallego, 802 P.2d 169, 210-
11 (Cal. 1990) (affirming sentence and rejecting argument that trial court vio-
lated defendant's constitutional right to impartial jury by denying defendant's
challenges for cause of two jurors); Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 725-26 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1990) (affirming defendant's sentence and refusing to recognize con-
stitutional necessity of posing "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry"), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2840 (1991), and abrogated by Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992); State
v. Atkins, 399 S.E.2d 760, 765 (S.C. 1990) (affirming defendant's sentence and
rejecting claim that fourjurors were predisposed to impose death penalty); Mor-
ris v. Commonwealth, 766 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Ky. 1989) (reversing sentence and
accepting defendant's argument that voir dire violated his right to impartial
jury); State v. Williams, 550 A.2d 1172, 1179 (NJ. 1988) (reversing defendant's
sentence because trial court committed numerous errors including conducting
inadequate voir dire); Skipper v. State, 364 S.E.2d 835, 839 (Ga. 1988) (revers-
ing defendant's sentence because voir dire violated defendant's right to impar-
tial jury).
70. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
71. Id. at 514.
72. Id. at 515. In Witherspoon, the trial court excluded all veniremen who
indicated that they had conscientious scruples against inflicting the death pen-
alty. Id. In fact, the trial judge initially remarked, "let's get these conscientious
objectors out of the way, without wasting any time on them." Id. at 514. Only 5
of the 47 jurors, however, voiced an automatic inability to impose the death
penalty upon conviction. Id.
73. Id. at 518-19. The Court held that although the prosecution clearly has
the right to exclude jurors who would never impose the death penalty, this right
does not expand to exclude every juror who has some reservation against the
death penalty. Id. at 519. One commentator has illustrated the conflict between
the state's interest in securing impartial jurors and the defendant's right to an
15
Peterson: Morgan v. Illinois: An Attempt to Provide Equality in the Selecti
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
1594 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38: p. 1579
interests, the Court determined that a juror who opposes the death pen-
alty is still potentially able to follow the law and uphold his or her
oath.7 4 Under the "Witherspoon inquiry," therefore, the trial judge must
exclude only thosejurors who would refuse to vote for the death penalty
without considering the evidence presented. 75 The Court held that a
trial judge must not exclude jurors who simply voiced general objections
to the death penalty.
76
Twelve years later, the Supreme Court decided Adams v. Texas. 7 In
Adams, the Court rejected the trial court's exclusion of jurors who were
unable to take an oath that "the mandatory penalty of death or impris-
onment for life would not affect their deliberations on any issue of fact."' 78
The Supreme Court held that a trial judge must not exclude a juror un-
impartial jury. See Thompson, supra note 12, at 188. Thompson has noted that
if the state is permitted to exclude all jurors who oppose the death penalty, then
impartial jurors favorable to the defendant may be excluded. Id. However, if
the state is not permitted to exclude jurors who oppose the death penalty, then
people unable to follow the law-and impose the death penalty-may be seated.
Id. Thompson has noted that the Witherspoon decision resolved this conflict in
the defendant's favor, ensuring that any mistakes in voir dire adversely compro-
mise the state's interest rather than the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
an impartial jury. ld.
74. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519. The Court stated "(a] man who opposes
the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary
judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus obey the oath he takes as a
juror." Id.
75. Id. The original intent of the Witherspoon Court was to limit the prosecu-
tion's challenges for cause where the juror expressed hesitation against the im-
position of the death penalty. Id at 520. Under Witherspoon, a trial court could
not exclude a juror simply because he or she did not champion the death pen-
alty. Id. However, subsequent cases have interpreted Witherspoon as defining a
bright-line rule for exclusion of prospective jurors: exclusion is warranted only
where a prospective juror states in advance of trial that he or she automatically
would oppose the death penalty. See, e.g., Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
In Adams, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute excluding jurors who
could not take an oath that a mandatory sentence of death or life imprisonment
would "not affect their deliberations on any issue of fact." Id. at 42. For a fur-
ther discussion of Adams, and how its language unintentionally modified Wither-
spoon, see infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
76. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522-23.
77. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
78. Id. at 42. The Texas Penal Code provides:
Prospective jurors shall be informed that a sentence of life imprison-
ment or death is mandatory on conviction of a capital felony. A pro-
spective juror. shall be disqualified from serving as a juror unless he
states under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment
for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact.
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (West 1974). Adams found the Texas Penal
Code unconstitutional as applied to the facts of that case. Adams, 448 U.S. at 50.
The Court held "the State may bar from jury service those whose beliefs about
capital punishment would lead them to ignore the law or violate their oaths. But
in the present case Texas has applied § 12.31(b) to exclude jurors whose only
fault was to take their responsibilities with special seriousness as honestly that
they might or might not be affected."
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less a juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance
of his [or her] duties as a juror."79 Although the Adams Court may not
have intended to narrow the Witherspoon holding, the Supreme Court
subsequently noted that Adams had this precise effect.80
In Wainwright v. Witt,8 1 the Supreme Court stated that Adams simpli-
fied the standard for exclusion.8 2 According to the Wainwright Court,
Adams had rejected the argument that a trial judge could only exclude
jurors who would never impose the death penalty. 83 The Wainwright
Court defined the standard for exclusion as follows: "Th[e] standard is
whether a juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the per-
formance of his duties as a juror in accordance with the instructions and
his oath." 84 The Wainwright Court further stated that appellate courts
should give great deference to a trial judge's decision on whether to
exclude a juror8 5 because a finding of bias often results from mental
impressions of a juror's credibility and demeanor that cannot be recre-
ated on appeal.8 6
Ironically, the Wainwright Court created the very problem that
Witherspoon sought to alleviate.87 Specifically, Witherspoon prohibited a
79. Adams, 448 U.S. at 45.
80. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). After Adams, prosecutors
no longer had to establish that a juror would automatically, and under every
circumstance, oppose capital punishment. Id. at 420-21. In Wainwright, the
Supreme Court construed Adams as dispensing with the requirement that a "ju-
ror's bias be proved with unmistakable clarity." Id at 424.
81. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
82. Id. at 421 (noting that Witherspoon standard "has been simplified").
83. Id. ("The tests with respect to sentencing and guilt . . . have been
merged; the requirement that a juror may be excluded only if he would never
vote for the death penalty is now missing; gone too is the extremely high burden
of proof.").
84. Id. at 424.
85. Id. at 424-25. The Court stated:
What common sense should have realized experience has proved:
many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the
point where their bias has been made "unmistakably clear;" these ve-
niremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing
the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide
their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record,
however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite
impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and im-
partially apply the law .... mhis is why deference must be paid to the
trial judge who sees and hears the juror.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
86. Id. at 428. The Court relied on the decision in Patton v. Yount, 467
U.S. 1025 (1984), which addressed the issue of exclusion because of bias, and
concluded that the question at issue was: "[d]id [the] juror swear that he could
set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the case on the evidence, and
should the juror's protestations of impartiality have been believed." Wainuright,
469 U.S. at 423-24 (quoting Patton, 467 U.S. at 1036).
87. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 898 (1968);
Wainwright, 469 U.S. 412. The Wainwright Court stated that its decision was
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trial judge's subjective exclusion ofjurors and only allowed exclusion of
jurors who "automatically opposed" the death penalty.88 In contrast,
Wainwright permitted exclusion ofjurors if a trial judge made a subjective
determination that the juror could not impose the law.8 9 The Wain-
wright decision further commanded appellate courts to give a trial
judge's determination great deference.9 0 The conflict between Wither-
spoon and Wainwright is irreconcilable. 9 1 Without overruling Witherspoon,
Wainwright abrogated the requirement that a juror must objectively and
automatically oppose the death penalty to warrant exclusion, and, in its
meant to "clarify" the Witherspoon decision and to reaffirm the Adams decision.
Id. at 424. The Court dispensed with the language in Witherspoon referring to
"automatic" opposition and held thit a juror's bias did not have to be proven
with "unmistakable clarity." Id.
Scholar Thompson has commented that the major difficulty with Wainwright
is that although it "departs markedly from the Witherspoon standard, the majority
opinion failed to acknowledge that the decision significantly changed the law."
See Thompson, supra note 12, at 205. For example, although the Wainwright
Court stated that the Adams decision ("substantially impair" language) was pref-
erable to the Witherspoon decision ("automatically opposed" language), many
practitioners had believed that Adams and Witherspoon were consistent. Id. at 206.
In fact, Adams had quoted with approval the language from Witherspoon. Id.
Thompson has postulated further that the Wainwright Court's failure to ac-
knowledge the change in the law permitted the Wainwright majority to avoid the
burden of justifying its abrogation of the Witherspoon holding. Id. Arguably,
such a justification would have been very difficult because the impetus behindWitherspoon was to protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury-a right fundamental to the essence of the Constitution. For a discussion of
the fundamental value of a trial by jury in the American criminal justice system,
see supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
88. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21. The Witherspoon Court had indicated
that the State still had the right to exclude jurors who made it "unmistakably
clear" that they "automatically" would vote against the death penalty. Id. As a
result, trial judges retained little, if any, discretion because only those jurors
who displayed an inability to impose the death penalty could be excluded. Id.
The Wainwright Court, however, permitted exclusion when the "trial judge is left
with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faith-
fully and impartially apply the law." Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 425-26.
One commentator has aptly illustrated the contradiction between Wain-
wright and Witherspoon. See Thompson, supra note 12, at 211 (noting that judges
are allowed "to rely on impressionistic evidence and own subjective reactions"
in Wainwright but not in Witherspoon). Thompson asserted: "This subjective eval-
uation allowed under Witt, was explicitly forbidden by Witherspoon. Witherspoon
emphasized that in determining a potential juror's qualifications, the judge must
rely on what the juror actually said, not only what the judge inferred or assumed about the
juror's position." Id. (emphasis added). By failing to clearly overrule Witherspoon
and explain the reasoning behind such abrogation, the Supreme Court set a con-
fusing precedent and permitted haphazard exclusion of jurors that depended
not so much on the ability of the juror to truly follow the law, but on the trial
judge's own perception of impartiality. See id. at 211.
89. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 426.
90. Id.
91. Brown, Note, supra note 2, at 571 (noting that Wainwright decision
emasculated Witherspoon formula and arguing that "in reality the two [Witt and
Witherspoon] tests differ vastly in language and substance").
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stead, substituted a subjective standard for such exclusion. 92
D. The Reverse-Witherspoon Inquiy
Although Witherspoon and its progeny addressed the prosecutor's right
to pose questions to prospective jurors regarding their capital sentenc-
ing views, few cases addressed whether defense counsel possessed a simi-
lar right.9 3 In the years immediately following the Witherspoon decision,
prosecutors could specifically ask jurors whether they would automati-
cally oppose the death penalty or whether they would be unable to im-
pose the death penalty upon conviction. 94 Courts and commentators
coined this the "Witherspoon inquiry." 95 However, the issue of whether
defense counsel could ask jurors if they would automatically impose the
death penalty upon conviction remained undecided for twenty years fol-
lowing Witherspoon.9 6 Courts and commentators coined this the "re-
verse-Witherspoon inquiry. ' 9 7
92. For an in depth discussion of the varying standards, see supra notes 70-
91 and accompanying text and Thompson, supra note 12, at 211-12 (noting that
subjective evaluation for exclusion in Wainwright was explicitly forbidden by
Witherspoon).
93. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). The original intent of the Witherspoon
Court was to limit the prosecutor's challenges for cause where jurors only ex-
pressed hesitation against imposing the death penalty. Id. at 520. For a discus-
sion of how courts following the Witherspoon decision interpreted its language,
see supra note 75.
94. See, e.g., People v. Gallego, 802 P.2d 169, 209-10 (Cal. 1990) (trial
court questioned jurors as to whether they could "follow the law and impose
death"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 337 (1991); People v. Bittaker, 774 P.2d 659, 678
(Cal. 1989) (court questioned jurors: "Do you have such a conscientious opin-
ion or religious conviction regarding the death penalty that if you found the
defendant guilty ... you would automatically find the penalty to be life impris-
onment?"), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990), and reh'g denied, 497 U.S. 1046
(1990); Skipper v. State, 364 S.E.2d 835, 839 (Ga. 1988) (proper question in voir
dire includes: "Are you conscientiously opposed to capital punishment?").
95. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 898 (1968).
Those jurors who were removed as a result of their response to the Witherspoon
inquiry were called "Witherspoon excludables." See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162, 170 (1986). Lockhart defined "Witherspoon excludables" as those jurors
"whose opposition to the death penalty is so strong that it would prevent them
from impartially determining a capital defendant's guilt or innocence." Id. Ar-
guably, the Lockhart Court feared that a juror who strongly opposed the death
penalty would rather acquit the defendant than find him guilty and be forced to
impose the death penalty.
96. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1250 (1988)
(stating in dicta that trial court's refusal to remove juror who asserted that he
automatically would impose death penalty was error under certain
circumstances).
97. People v. Brisbon, 478 N.E.2d 402, 409 (Ill. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
908 (1985). Brisbon may have been the first court to coin the phrase "reverse-
Witherspoon." Id. Brisbon stated that a "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry" was
equivalent to a "life qualification" permitting exclusion of all jurors who would
automatically impose the death penalty. Id.
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Ross v. Oklahoma,98 a 1988 Supreme Court decision finally ad-
dressed the "reverse-Witherspoon" issue, albeit in dicta.9 9 The Ross
Court stated that after Witherspoon, a trial court's refusal to remove a
juror who asserted that he or she would automatically impose the death
penalty would constitute error under certain circumstances.' 0 0 Thus,
the Ross Court seemingly condoned a defense counsel's request to pose
a "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry."''1 However, because the Court only
discussed such an inquiry in dicta, many trial courts refused to follow
this rule and curtailed defense counsels' questioning of potential ju-
rors. 10 2 Subsequent to Ross, state courts diverged on the permissibility
of posing a "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry."' 0 3 Thus, although Duncan
and Irvin entitled a defendant to an impartial jury, states differed as to
whether this impartiality requirement mandated a "reverse-Witherspoon
inquiry."10 4
E. A Divergence in State Case Law Concerning the Applicability of The
Reverse- Witherspoon Inquiry
Two distinct views developed regarding the propriety of a defense
counsel's request to pose a "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry."' 1 5 An exam-
98. 487 U.S. 81 (1988).
99. Id. at 84. In Ross, a prospective juror declared that if the jury found the
defendant guilty, he would automatically vote for the imposition of the death
penalty. Id. Although the court did not excuse this juror for cause, the defense
counsel used a peremptory challenge to remove him. Id. As a result, he did not
sit on the panel that later convicted and sentenced the defendant to death. Id.
The Court stated, however, that "[h]ad [the juror] sat on the jury that ultimately
sentenced petitioner to death, and had petitioner properly preserved his right to
challenge the trial court's failure to remove (him], the sentence would have to be
overturned." Id. at 85.
100. Id. at 85.
101. Id.
102. For a discussion of several state court decisions refusing to permit a
"reverse-Witherspoon inquiry" and the defendant's ability to empanel an impartial
jury in these jurisdictions, see infra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
103. For a discussion of the divergence in state case law concerning the
appropriateness of posing a "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry," see infra notes 106-28
and accompanying text.
104. People v. Jackson, 582 N.E.2d 125, 156 (Ill. 1991) (advancing view
that defendant has no constitutional right to pose a "reverse-Witherspoon in-
quiry"), cert. granted andjudgment vacated by 113 S. Ct. 32 (1992) (subsequent to
Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992)). But cf. State v. Williams, 550 A.2d
1172, 1185 (N.J. 1988) (advancing view that defendant has constitutional right
to pose "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry"). For a further discussion of the two dis-
tinct views concerning the propriety of a "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry," see infra
notes 106-28 and accompanying text.
105. State v. Hyman, 281 S.E.2d 209, 211 (S.C. 1981) (stating that trial
court does not have to pose "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry" to protect defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to impartial jury), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122 (1982), and
rehg denied, 458 U.S. 1132 (1982), and overruled on other grounds by State v. Tor-
rence, 406 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. 1991), and abrogated by Morgan v. Illinois 112 S. Ct.
2222 (1992). But cf. Skipper v. State, 364 S.E.2d 835, 839 (Ga. 1988) (finding
1598 [Vol. 38: p. 1579
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 5 [1993], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss5/5
1993] NoTE 1599
ple of the first view is the Supreme Court of South Carolina's decision in
State v. Hyman.10 6 In Hyman, the defendant contended that the trial
court's failure to ask each prospective juror whether he or she was "un-
alterably opposed to granting a life sentence in a murder case" consti-
tuted reversible error.1 0 7 The South Carolina Court rejected this
argument and held that simply asking whether a juror could give both
the state and the defendant a fair trial was constitutionally sufficient.10 8
The court further held that an affirmative answer to this question quali-
fied the juror as impartial.10 9 In so holding, the Supreme Court of
that trial court does have to pose "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry" to protect de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment right to impartial jury).
106. 281 S.E.2d 209 (S.C. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122 (1982).
107. Id. at 211. The trial jury convicted the defendant of armed robbery
and murder and the same jury sentenced the defendant to death. Id. On appeal,
the defendant argued that the trial court erred in failing to clearly ascertain
whether the jurors would automatically impose the death penalty upon convic-
tion. Id.
108. Id. The Supreme Court of South Carolina summarily rejected the de-
fendant's argument. Id The court asserted that "[a] review of the voir dire ex-
amination in this case reveal[ed] that the prospective jurors were asked if they
could give both the State and the appellant a fair and impartial trial. The voir
dire conducted ensured the appellant was so tried." Id.
109. Id. Several states support the Hyman view that it is constitutionally
sufficient to ask a potential juror if he or she would be fair and impartial. See,
e.g., Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719 (Del. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2840 (1991),
and abrogated by Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992). In Riley, the Supreme
Court of Delaware rejected the defendant's contention that the trial court's re-
fusal to pose a "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry" violated the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury. Id. at 725. According to the court, "it
would be redundant to require the trial court to further interrogate the jurors as
to whether they would automatically impose the death penalty upon a finding of
guilt." Id.
Ironically, the Riley court did not find it "redundant" to allow the prosecu-
tion to further interrogate the jurors to determine whether they would automati-
cally oppose the death penalty. In other words, it was redundant for the defense
to pose a "reverse- Witherspoon inquiry," but it was not redundant for the prose-
cution to pose a traditional "Witherspoon inquiry." For a discussion of the incon-
sistency in this reasoning, see infra notes 111-13 & 125-28 and accompanying
text.
In accord with the Hyman and Riley view is People v. Bittaker, 774 P.2d 659
(Cal. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990), and reh'g denied, 497 U.S. 1046
(1990). In Bittaker, the Supreme Court of California affirmed a death sentence
where the trial court refused to specifically ask a juror whether he would auto-
matically impose the death penalty. Id. at 681. The court stated: "The right to
voir dire.., is not a constitutional right but a means to achieve the end of an
impartial jury." Id. Although the California Supreme Court stated that the de-
fense should have been permitted to ask additional questions of some jurors
who gave ambiguous answers, every juror that gave an ambiguous answer was
removed by the defense or the prosecution by use of a peremptory challenge.
Id. Thus, while the trial court should have permitted the defense to ask these
questions, the court held that it was harmless error because the jurors were ulti-
mately removed by use of peremptory challenges. Id
Although the Bittaker court seemed to embrace the Hyman and Riley view, it
is important to note that the California Supreme Court confronted a case in
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South Carolina advanced the view that although the Sixth Amendment
entitled the defendant to an impartial jury, the Constitution did not re-
quire a "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry.""10
This view led to a disparity in the questioning available to deter-
mine a juror's impartiality.I1 I Under jurisdictions following the Hyman
view, the Constitution enabled both the prosecution and the defense to
request the trial judge to pose the general question of whether a juror
could be impartial. 12 However, the Hyman view only enabled the prose-
cution to request that the trial judge pose a further and more specific
question to potential jurors-would you automatically oppose the death
penalty?" 13
Other courts rejected this unbalanced exchange, adopting a differ-
which the defendant had brutally and mercilessly raped, beaten, tortured and
murdered five young girls. Id. at 664-65. This author notes that it is arguable
that these distinctions provided the court with a legal justification to uphold a
sentence of a defendant who had nicknamed himself "Bittaker pliers" and
bragged that he had "pinched a victims legs and breast with a vice grip finally
tearing off a nipple, then thrust an ice pick through the breast.., and through
[her] ear" until she finally fell dead. Id. at 668-69. The court concluded:
This case is one in which the evidence of aggravation was unusually
strong. Defendant kidnapped and murdered five teenage girls, raped
four of them and tortured at least one. The photographs of the victims,
and the shocking tape recording of the torture of the last victim could
not help but impress a jury .... On this record we can declare that there
is no reasonable possibility that had the errors not occurred a different
verdict would have been rendered. The judgment is affirmed.
Id. at 697. Thus, although this case clearly supports the view that the constitu-
tion does not require a "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry," the extreme brutality of
the crimes may suggest an impetus for the court's holding.
110. Hyman, 281 S.E.2d at 211.
111. See, e.g., Riley, 585 A.2d at 725 (permitting prosecution to pose a
"Witherspoon inquiry" but refusing defense request to pose "reverse-Witherspoon"
inquiry); State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 589 (Utah 1983) (same), cert. denied, 66
U.S. 942 (1984), and overruled on other grounds by State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421
(1986). For a further discussion of this disparity, see infra notes 112-13 & 125-
28 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., People v.Jackson, 582 N.E.2d 125, 156 (Il1. 1991) (noting that
no constitutional violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right occurred
where "each juror swore to uphold the law regardless of his or her personal
feelings, and no juror expressed any views that would call his or her impartiality
into question"), cert. granted andjudgrent vacated by 113 S. Ct. 32 (1992) (subse-
quent to Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992)); Hyman, 281 S.E.2d at 211
(finding impartiality assuged by trial court's asking prospective jurors whether
they could give both state and defendant fair and impartial trial), cert. denied, 458
U.S. 1122 (1982), and reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1132 (1982).
113. See, e.g., Riley, 585 A.2d at 725 (affirming conviction and sentence
where trial court permitted prosecution to ask jurors about ability to impose
death penalty but refused to permit defense to ask jurors about ability to impose
life sentence); State v. Rogers, 341 S.E.2d 713, 722 (N.C. 1986) (affirming con-
viction and sentence where trial court permitted prosecution to pose Witherspoon
inquiry but refused defense counsel's request to pose "reverse-Witherspoon in-
quiry"), overruled on other grounds by State v. Vandiver, 364 S.E.2d 373 (N.C.
1988).
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ent view of the "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry."' 14 In Skipper v. State, 15
the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed the propriety of the trial
court's refusal to allow a "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry." 116 The trial
court had refused the defendant's request to ask jurors whether they
would be capable of considering penalties other than death.' 17 The
Supreme Court of Georgia held that the trial court's refusal to accede to
the defendant's request deprived the defendant of his constitutional
right to an impartial jury.' 1 8 The Georgia court reasoned that "[t]he
trial court's limitation on voir dire deprived the defendant of an oppor-
tunity to determine whether prospective jurors were impartial on the
question of sentence."' " 9
In accord with Skipper is the New Jersey Supreme Court decision
State v. Williams.' 20 In Williams, the court addressed the propriety of the
trial court's refusal to ask jurors who stated that they favored the death
penalty in certain cases whether they favored the death penalty in mur-
der and rape cases.1 2 1 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
refusal to so inquire, coupled with other errors, constituted a violation
of the defendant's right to an impartial jury.' 2 2 Accordingly, the court
114. See, e.g., Morris v. Commonwealth, 766 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Ky. 1989) (rec-
ognizing constitutional propriety of posing "reverseWitherspoon inquiry" and re-
versing sentence where trial court refused to strike jurors who indicated they
would automatically impose the death penalty upon conviction); Pickens v. State,
730 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Ark. 1987) (reversing defendant's conviction and recog-
nizing that "proper inquiry on voir dire ... would be to ask the veniremen if
they would first consider and weigh the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances involved when determining whether to impose a death sentence or life
imprisonment without parole), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987).
115. 364 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. 1988).
116. Id. at 839. In Skipper, the defendant appealed a death sentence after
his conviction for murder, sodomy and rape. Id. at 836-38.
117. Id. at 839. The court stated: "The trial court's limitation on voir dire
deprived the defendant of an opportunity to determine whether prospective ju-
rors were impartial on the question of sentence." Id. Specifically, a juror who
said she "would vote for it [death penalty]" was not allowed to be examined
further as to whether she would vote for it in "all circumstances." Id. at 839 n.2.
118. Id. at 839. The Supreme Court of Georgia recognized that:
A criminal defendant is entitled to an impartial jury by the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. A juror who has made up his
mind prior to trial that he will not weigh evidence in mitigation is not
impartial. [Such a] juror's views on capital punishment would "prevent
or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in ac-
cordance with his instructions and his oath."
Id. (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)).
119. Id.
120. 550 A.2d 1172 (N.J. 1988).
121. Id. at 1182.
122. Id. at 1184. The New Jersey court stated the "trial court's refusal to
allow questions that... provide important insight into any juror's attitude...
constitutes serious error... [because] the lawyers and the court were prevented
from gathering information about whether a juror would automatically impose
the death penalty on a defendant found guilty of rape and murder." Id. This
1993] NOTE 1601
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reversed the sentence, holding that the trial judge must allow the de-
fense counsel to question prospective jurors about their ability to con-
sider a life sentence. 123 The court viewed such questioning as an
essential element in preserving the defendant's ability to receive an im-
partial trial.1 24
This distinct divergence in state views led to diametrically opposed
results in case law.' 25 For example, the trial court's failure to permit
language seemed to condone questions even more expansive than a "reverse-
Witherspoon inquiry" permitting questions on juror's attitudes concerning "a
rape and a murder." Id. The Williams court, however, retreated from this broad
interpretation when it concluded "[w]hether or not the trial court's refusal to
inquire further regarding the murder and rape issue would, by itself, suffice to
compel reversal we do not decide; the trial court's failure to make this inquiry is
a significant component of the deficiencies on which our result.., is based."
Id. Thus, even though a refusal to pose a "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry" impairs
the defense counsel's ability to empanel an impartial jury, it may not be suffi-
cient to require automatic reversal. Id.
123. Id. The Williams court stated:
[A] juror who will not, or cannot, consider relevant mitigating evidence
pertaining to the defendant ... is "substantially impaired" under the
Adams-Wilt test. Therefore, the failure to inquire into whether any juror
could consider the mitig.tion evidence.., denied counsel and the trial
court the tools with which to insure that the jury panel could fairly un-
dertake its role in this case.
Id.
124. Id. Other courts have adopted the Hyman and Williams view. See, e.g.,
Patterson v. Commonwealth, 283 S.E.2d 212, 215 (Va. 1981) (reversing sen-
tence where trial court refused to pose question: "Do you feel that regardless of
the facts or circumstances that in every case of murder the death penalty should
be imposed?") (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Evans v.
Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1025 (1985));
Morris v. Commonwealth, 766 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Ky. 1989) (reversing sentence
where trial court refused to exclude four jurors who stated they would only con-
sider the death penalty if conviction resulted); State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577,
589 (Utah 1983) (holding that "the court should inquire, when so requested by
the defendant, whether there are any jurors whose convictions would compel
them to vote for capital punishment for all persons convicted of murder"), cert.
denied, 66 U.S. 942 (1984), and overruled on other grounds by State v. Hansen, 734
P.2d 421 (Utah 1986).
In Patterson, the Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the defense coun-
sel's argument that "if the prosecutor has a right to exclude such veniremen for
cause, 'certainly the Defendant should have a right to exclude for cause thosejurors who are irrevocably committed to voting for the death penalty in the
event of a conviction of the capital offense.'" Patterson, 283 S.E.2d at 215. In
Morris, the Supreme Court of Kentucky overturned a death sentence and noted
"with interest" that the trial court refused to pose a "reverse-Witherspoon in-
quiry" and did not exclude four jurors who said that they would automatically
impose the death sentence. Morris, 766 S.W.2d at 60. The Morris trial court,
however, willingly posed the traditional "Witherspoon inquiry" and excluded sixjurors who said they would automatically oppose the death penalty. Id. Such a
dichotomy mandated reversal. Id. In Norton, the court asserted that in order to
protect a capital defendant's interest in an impartial jury, a trial judge must pose
a "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry" when so requested by the defense. Norton, 675
P.2d at 589.
125. Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 725-26 (Del. 1990) (stating that defend-
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defense counsel to pose a "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry" in a Skipper and
Williams jurisdiction resulted in a deprivation of the defendant's due
process rights and required sentence reversal.' 26 However, in a Hyman
jurisdiction, the trial court's refusal to pose a "reverse-Witherspoon in-
quiry" did not result in a deprivation of the defendant's due process
rights. 127 Thus, a defendant's constitutional rights were inextricably
linked to the state in which he or she allegedly committed the crime. 128
This jurisdictional disparity set the stage for the United States
Supreme Court case, Morgan v. Illinois,129 in which the Court decided
whether a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to pose a "re-
verse-Witherspoon inquiry."' 30
III. ANALYSIS
A. Facts and Procedure
In Morgan v. Illinois,131 the trial jury convicted the defendant of first-
degree murder for allegedly shooting a drug dealer for four thousand
dollars.' 32 Under Illinois law, a jury may sentence a criminal defendant
convicted of first-degree murder to death.' 33 Illinois law, however, re-
ant does not have constitutional right to pose "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry"),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2840 (1991) and abrogated by Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct.
2222 (1992). But cf. State v. Williams, 550 A.2d 1172, 1184 (NJ. 1988) (stating
that defendant has right to pose "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry" and that failure to
allow questioning "denied counsel and the trial court the tools with which to
insure that the jury panel could fairly undertake its role in this case").
126. For a discussion of the requirement to pose a "reverse-Witherspoon in-
quiry" in a Skipper and Williams jurisdiction, seesupra notes 114-24 and accompa-
nying text.
127. For a discussion of the Hyman view rejecting the requirement to pose a
"reverse-Witherspoon inquiry," see supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., State v. Hyman, 281 S.E.2d 209, 211-12 (S.C. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 458 U.S. 1122, reh'gdenied, 458 U.S. 1132 (1982), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. 1991), and abrogated by Morgan v. Illinois
112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992). According to Hyman, a defendant on trial for a capital
crime in South Carolina does not have a constitutional right to pose a "reverse-
Witherspoon inquiry." Id. However, if the same defendant was tried in New
Jersey, he would have a constitutional right to pose a "reverse-Witherspoon in-
quiry." See, e.g., Williams, 550 A.2d at 1184 (holding that failure to permit "re-
verse-Witherspoon inquiry" would deny defendant his constitutional right to
obtain impartial jury).
129. 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992).
130. For a discussion of the issues presented in Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S.
Ct. 2222 (1992), see infra notes 141-76 and accompanying text.
131. 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992).
132. Id. at 2226. Defendant Morgan was hired to kill a rival drug dealer.
Id. The El Rukns, a notorious Chicago gang, gave defendant four thousand dol-
lars to murder the drug dealer who had allegedly been competing with the El
Rukns' narcotics business. Id. Morgan lured the victim into an abandoned
apartment and shot him in the head six times. Id.
133. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b)(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
Under Illinois criminal law, at least one aggravating factor must be present to
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quires a jury to consider aggravating and mitigating factors prior to ren-
dering a sentence.13 4
Subsequent to the presentation of aggravating and mitigating evi-
dence, the Morgan jury returned a sentence of death.' 3 5 The defendant
appealed.' 3 6 On appeal, the defendant alleged a violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury based on the trial court's refusal
to ask jurors whether they would automatically impose the death penalty
upon conviction.1 37 The alleged failure, therefore, was the trial court's
refusal to pose a "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry."' I3 8 Both the Illinois ap-
pellate court and the Illinois Supreme Court rejected this argument and
affirmed the defendant's death sentence.' 3 9 The defendant subse-
quently petitioned the United States Supreme Court to decide the issue,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.1 40
B. The Analysis of the Morgan Court
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court addressed four issues
concerning the procedures in a capital trial: 1) whether a sentencing
jury in a capital hearing must be impartial; 2) whether a juror who ad-
warrant imposition of the death penalty. Id. para. 9-1(g). The statute reads: "If
at the separate sentencing proceeding the jury finds that none of the factors set
forth in subsection (b) exists, [aggravating factors,] the court shall sentence the
defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections." Id.
134. Id. para. 9-1(d)(1). The statute states that a separate sentencing pro-
ceeding to determine the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors "shall
be conducted ... before the jury that determined the defendant's guilt ... or
before the court if the defendant waives a jury for the separate proceeding." Id.
The statute also provides that either the court or the jury "shall consider any
aggravating and any mitigating factors which are relevant to the imposition of
the death penalty." Id. para. 9-1(c) (emphasis added). For a further discussion
of the Illinois statute's requirement that ajury "consider" aggravating and miti-
gating factors and the Morgan Court's interpretation of this requirement, see
infra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
135. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2227.
136. Id
137. Id. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, reh'g denied, 392 U.S.
947 (1968), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. For a more de-
tailed discussion of the Duncan decision and the evolution of the constitutional
guarantees afforded to a state criminal defendant, see supra notes 31-51 and ac-
companying text.
138. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2227.
139. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected petitioner's claim that pursu-
ant to Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1250 (1988), voir
dire must include a "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry." Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2227.
The Illinois Supreme Court instead concluded that there is no requirement in a
capital case that a trial court question jurors to determine who would vote for
the death penalty in every case upon conviction. Id. (citing People v. Morgan,
568 N.E.2d 755, 778 (11. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S.Ct. 295 (1991), and judgment
reversedby 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992)).
140. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2227.
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mits during voir dire that he or she automatically will impose the death
penalty upon conviction may be challenged for cause; 3) whether the
trial court, upon defendant's request, must question a prospective juror
about his views toward capital punishment; and 4) whether the trial
court's voir dire was constitutionally sufficient.14 1
1. The Requirement That a Capital Sentencing Juror Be Impartial
The Morgan Court relied on Duncan v. Louisiana14 2 in concluding
that the defendant was entitled to an impartial sentencing jury.t4 3 The
Court recognized that although no law specifically required Illinois to
utilize jurors in the sentencing phase, once Illinois chose to provide de-
fendants with a jury in the sentencing phase, that jury had to remain
impartial. 144 According to the Morgan Court, a failure to afford the de-
fendant an impartial sentencing jury violated even the minimal stan-
dards of due process.145 The Court opined that a sentencing juror who
is not impartial will not base his or her verdict on the mitigating and
aggravating evidence presented, but rather, will make an ad hoc deter-
mination that essentially denies the defendant the right to a "fair trial in
a fair tribunal."' 4 6
141. For a discussion of the Morgan Court's determination that a sentencing
jury in a capital hearing must be impartial, see infra notes 142-46 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of the Morgan Court's determination that a juror,
who admits that he or she will automatically impose the death penalty upon con-
viction, must be excluded for cause, see infra notes 147-57 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the Morgan Court's determination that a trial court,
upon defendant's request must permit questioning concerning ajuror's views on
capital punishment, see infra notes 158-70 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of the Morgan Court's finding on the constitutional insufficiency of the trial
court's voir dire, see infra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
142. 391 U.S. 145, reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968); see Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961). For a discussion of the Court's determination that the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee to an impartial jury applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, see supra notes 31-51 and accompanying text.
143. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2228. The Morgan majority adhered to prior
Supreme Court decisions that refused to reverse criminal defendants' convic-
tions where the same jurors who were "death qualified" were held not to be
impartial in the sentencing phase. Id. at 2235 n.1 1 (citing Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 n.21 (1968)).
144. Morgan, 112 S. Ct at 2228. The Morgan Court recognized that states
are not required to provide ajury to a defendant during the sentencing phase of
a criminal trial. Id. (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986)). If, however, a state voluntarily chooses to let ajury
determine the sentence, that jury must meet the constitutional guarantees pro-
vided under the Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In
Duncan, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause incorporated the
Sixth Amendment's mandate to state proceedings. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157-58.
For a more detailed discussion of the Duncan holding, see supra notes 36-42 and
accompanying text.
145. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2228 (citingln re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) and
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
146. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2228. The Supreme Court noted that the de-
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2. Ensuring Impartiality: Challenges for Cause
Once the Morgan Court determined that Duncan entitled a criminal
defendant to an impartial sentencing jury, the Court faced the difficult
task of determining the means for ensuring impartiality. 147 The Morgan
Court reexamined the Wainwright and Adams standard, which provides:
"[T]he proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may
be excused for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment
... is whether the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair'
the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instruc-
tions and his oath."'14 8 The Court stated that Wainwright and Adams es-
poused the principle that a juror who automatically opposed the death
penalty was not impartial and must be removed for cause.149
The Court then reexamined its decision in Ross, which indicated
that a trial judge's refusal to remove a juror who was not impartial con-
stituted a constitutional error.' 50 The Court noted that contrary to
Wainwright and Adams, the Ross Court addressed whether a juror who
would automatically impose the death penalty was partial and should be
removed for cause.1 5 1
The Morgan Court embraced the Ross language that read, "[h]ad
[the juror] sat on the jury that ultimately sentenced petitioner to death,
and had petitioner properly preserved his right to challenge the trial
court's failure to remove [the juror] for cause, the sentence would have
to be overturned." 52 The Court applied this reasoning to the facts in
Morgan, and concluded that a juror who automatically will impose the
death penalty without considering mitigating factors is not impartial as
required by the Sixth Amendment. 5 3 The Morgan Court held that be-
fendants who often covet the protections of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments are those accused of the most heinous of crimes, who appear most guilty
and are in the lowest stations of life. Id. However, those characteristics in no
way lessen the constitutional guarantees of impartiality, and therefore, any viola-
tion of this impartiality violates the defendant's due process rights. Id. at 2229.
147. Id. at 2229. For a discussion of the difficulties that trial courts face in
attempting to identify impartial jurors, see supra notes 66-128 and accompany-
ing text.
148. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,
424 n.5 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980))).
149. Id. For a discussion of the removal for cause ofjurors who would au-
tomatically oppose the death penalty, see supra notes 70-76. The Wainwright and
Adams decisions, in fact, did not require ajuror to automatically oppose the death
penalty as the Morgan majority states. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 412; Adams, 448
U.S. at 45. Rather, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), mandated ex-
clusion ofjurors who automatically opposed the death penalty. Id.
150. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85, reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1250 (1988).
For a discussion of the Ross opinion, see supra notes 98-104 and accompanying
text.
151. Ross, 487 U.S. at 85.
152. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229 (quoting Ross, 487 U.S. at 85).
153. Id. The Court stated: "[A] juror who will automatically vote for the
death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of
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cause such a juror will be unable to follow the law, he or she must be
excluded for cause.154 Failure to exclude such juror would require the
sentence to be overturned.' 55
In the dissent,Justice Scalia,joined by two otherjustices, found that
Illinois law does not require thatjurors consider mitigating evidence.' 5 6
Rather, the dissent interpreted the Illinois criminal statute to allow ju-
rors to define for themselves what constitutes a mitigating factor and to
refuse to impose a life sentence if the facts are not "sufficient[ly]"
mitigating. 157
3. The Insufficiency of a General Voir Dire
Although the Morgan Court acknowledged that the Constitution
provides no specific requirements for a trial court's conduct in voir dire
proceedings, the Court concluded that the Constitution does require ad-
equate voir dire questioning to identify unqualified jurors.' 5 8 The
aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do."
Id. The Illinois criminal statute, pertinent to the case at bar, requires jurors in a
sentencing phase to consider both aggravating and mitigating factors to deter-
mine the appropriate sentence. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para.9-1(c) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1992) (stating that court or jury "shall consider any aggravating or
mitigating factors which are relevant"). For a discussion of the relevant provi-
sion in the Illinois criminal statute, see supra notes 133-34 and accompanying
text.
154. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229. Exclusion for cause is appropriate where
the juror questioned would be unable to follow the law. Id. For example, in
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526 (1973), the Supreme Court held that
a trial court must exclude for cause a prospective juror whose racial prejudice
makes it impossible for the juror to remain fair and impartial. For a discussion
of exclusion for cause, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
155. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2230. No court, including Morgan, which has
addressed an impartiality issue under either a "Witherspoon" or "reverse-Wither-
spoon" inquiry, has held that an appellate court must overturn a guilty verdict
based on the failure to meet constitutional impartiality requirements. See
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518 (1968) (no bias shown with respect to
guilt phase of trial); Skipper v. State, 364 S.E.2d 835, 839 (Ga. 1988) (error as to
sentence does not affect conviction); State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 589 (Utah
1983) (conviction affirmed but sentence vacated for error in voir dire), cert. de-
nied, 466 U.S. 942 (1984), and overruled on other grounds by State v. Hansen, 734
P.2d 421 (1986); Patterson v. Commonwealth, 283 S.E.2d 212, 216 (Va. 1981)
(jury not meeting constitutional standards in sentencing not necessarily biased
as to guilt).
156. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2237 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
157. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 2230. While the intent of voir dire is to obtain an impartial jury,
the Constitution does not "dictate a catechism for voir dire." Id. The State of
Illinois argued that the trial court's general questioning concerning a juror's
ability to be fair and impartial was sufficient to obtain an impartialjury. Id. The
Morgan majority rejected this argument. Id. at 2233. The Court explained that ajuror who dogmatically supported the death penalty for all capital offenses could
honestly believe that he or she is fair and impartial. Id. In Morgan, for example,
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Court held that in a death penalty case, an adequate voir dire requires a
judge to ask, when requested by the defense, whether ajuror would "au-
tomatically impose" the death penalty upon conviction. 159 Insofar as a
trial court refuses to pose such a question, the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights are violated and the sentence must be overturned.16 0
The Court further emphasized the importance of voir dire in cases
in which the prosecution seeks the death penalty. 161 The Court held
that direct questioning about a juror's inclination to impose the death
penalty would protect a defendant and would enable a court to seques-
ter an impartial jury as required under the Constitution.162
The Morgan majority further emphasized that a juror who admits
that he or she automatically would impose the death penalty upon convic-
tion cannot be impartial because such an admission portrays an inability
to "consider" any mitigating factors as required under Illinois law. 163
The Court reasoned that the language of the statute mandating that a
juror consider mitigating evidence would be meaningless if a juror were
free to disregard even the presentation of mitigating evidence.' 64 The
one juror who had initially answered that she could be fair and impartial, upon
further questioning, later admitted that if guilt was established, she would "want
[defendant] hung." L at 2227 n.2.
159. Id. at 2233. At a minimum, the Morgan Court permits a defendant on
trial to "ascertain" whether jurors who believe they are impartial actually would
remain impartial once the trial court renders a guilty verdict. Id. This line of
questioning is similar to other voir dire inquiries that attempt to determine the
impartiality of a prospective juror. See Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308,
314 (1931) (essential demands of fairness require that defense be able to deter-
mine whetherjuror is racially prejudiced against defendant's race). For a discus-
sion of the case law requiring interrogation of prospective jurors regarding
racial prejudice, see supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text. Furthermore,
after Witherspoon v. Illinois, direct inquiry concerning a juror's inability to impose
the death penalty was permitted. See 391 U.S. 510 (1968). For a discussion of
the Witherspoon decision, see supra notes 70-76 & 87-92 and accompanying text.
The Morgan Court based its decision on this prior case law that had embraced
direct questioning as essential to determine impartiality. 112 S. Ct. at 2230-31.
160. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2235. The Court stated that the jury empaneled
did not meet the constitutional requirements of the Sixth Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id For a discussion of the Sixth Amendment and its
application to states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra notes 31-
51 and accompanying text.
. 161. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2223. The Court stated that "(a] defendant on
trial for his life must be permitted on voir dire to ascertain whether his prospec-
tive jurors" are impartial. Id In addition, the Court indicated that such a deter-
mination could be easily made by allowing a direct question, such as, "Would
you automatically impose the death penalty if you found defendant guilty?" Id.
Significantly, the Court determined that the risk assumed by asking such a ques-
tion is far less than the risk assumed by failing to ask such a question and having
a biased jury. Id. (citing Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35-36 (1986), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1017 (1988)).
162. Id. at 2231. For a discussion of the requirement of impartiality in a
capital sentencing case, see supra notes 66-124 and accompanying text.
163. 112 S. Ct. at 2234.
164. Id. The Illinois statute mandates that ajudge or jury "shall consider
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Court recognized, however, that although Illinois law requires ajuror to
"consider" mitigating factors prior to rendering a sentence, it does not
compel a juror to accept any or all evidence as sufficiently mitigating. 16 5
The dissent disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the Illi-
nois law. 166 The dissent stated that Illinois law does not preclude aju-
ror "from taking the bright-line position that there are no valid reasons
why a defendant who has committed a contract killing should not be
sentenced to death."' 6 7 The dissent read the Illinois criminal statute
requiring a jury to "consider" mitigating factors to mean that a juror
who believes any evidence is mitigating may consider that evidence and
determine the punishment.' 68 Ajuror who fails to find any evidence to
be mitigating is not failing to follow the law, but is failing to "give it the
effect the defendant desires."' 6 9 Accordingly, the dissent would have
held that a juror under Illinois law may always disregard such
evidence. 170
4. The Insufficiency of the Trial Court's Voir Dire
The Morgan trial court asked each prospective juror general ques-
tions concerning his or her ability to be impartial. 17 1 On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, the Morgan majority found the voir dire to
be constitutionally inadequate, noting that jurors who respond affirma-
tively may still have views that inhibit their ability to follow the law. 172
The majority further noted the inconsistency in permitting defense
the mitigating evidence presented." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para.9-1 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1992). The majority stated that a juror who would automatically
impose the death penalty upon conviction is "announcing an intention not to
follow the instructions to consider the mitigating evidence and to decide if it is
sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty." Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2234.
If a juror did not have to consider such evidence, the "sufficiency" clause of the
Illinois criminal statute would be meaningless. Id.
165. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2234.
166. Id. at 2237 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Morgan majority stated that the dissent
misread the language of the Illinois statute by concluding that no consideration
is required. Id. at 2234. In fact, the majority stated that the statute is clear in
mandating that a court shall consider, or instruct the jury to consider any miti-
gating evidence presented. Id.; see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para.9-1 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1992). The majority stated that the only thing the statute does not
mandate is the conclusion that a juror must reach. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2234.
Thus, two jurors who consider the presented evidence may come to varying con-
clusions on the effect to be given to that evidence. Id.
169. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2237 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
170. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 2226-27.
172. Id. at 2233. The Morgan Court portrayed the insufficiency of general
voir dire by quoting a prospective juror who stated that she would follow the law
but upon further questioning indicated that she would "want the defendant
hanged if he was found guilty." Id. at 2227 n.2.
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counsel to ask only general questions regarding impartiality. 17 The
Court opined that the state's own request to ask jurors whether they
automatically would oppose the death penalty belied the state's argu-
ment that general questions are sufficient to determine impartiality.' 7 4
The Court further opined that if ajuror's impartiality can be determined
through general questioning, then the Witherspoon and Wainwright deci-
sions are superfluous. 17 5 Rejecting the validity of this argument, the
Court held that the trial court's refusal to pose a "reverse-Witherspoon
inquiry" marked the inadequacy of voir dire and mandated sentence
reversal. 176
C. Critical Discussion of the Morgan Decision
The Morgan Court provided a bright-line rule for a trial judge con-
ducting voir dire:177 when requested by defense counsel, the trial judge
must ask prospective jurors whether they would automatically impose
death upon conviction.17 8 In formulating this bright-line rule, the Mor-
gan Court relied on the Sixth Amendment impartiality requirement.' 7 9
The Court reasoned that the very essence of impartiality is violated if a
juror refuses even to consider the mitigating evidence presented by the
defense.' 8 0 This reasoning is consistent with constitutional mandates
and with the Supreme Court's prior decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois.18 1
First, Morgan is consistent with the Sixth Amendment because it at-
tempted to provide equality within the criminal justice system. The de-
cision has provided the defense with the reciprocal opportunity to
ascertain a juror's specific views on the death penalty.' 82 Moreover, be-
cause the Morgan decision mandates exclusion of jurors who will auto-
matically impose death upon conviction, the resulting sentencing jury
173. Id. at 2232-33.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2235.
177. Id. The Court stated:
[a]nyjuror to whom mitigating factors are irrelevant should be disqual-
ified for cause for thatjuror has formed an opinion concerning the mer-
its of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial.
Accordingly, the defendant in this case was entitled to have the inquiry
made that he proposed to the trial judge.
Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2228-29. For a discussion of the Sixth Amendment's require-
ment that a jury be impartial and its application to state criminal trials by virtue
of the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra notes 31-51.
180. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2228-29.
181. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). For a discussion of the Witherspoon holding, see
supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
182. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2233. The Court stated "[a] defendant on trial
for his life must be permitted on voir dire to ascertain whether his prospective
jurors" are unable to follow the "dictates of the law." Id.
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will be impartial.' 8 3 Witherspoon had purported to achieve this result. 18 4
However, prior to Morgan, many empaneled juries merely provided im-
partiality for the prosecution. 185 The prosecution could pose a "Wither-
spoon inquiry" to determine if a juror would never vote for the death
penalty.' 86 Morgan provided this same opportunity to the defense.' 8 7
The significance of Morgan lies in its attempt to provide equality in
voir dire and in its straightforward and easily applicable guidelines to
achieve this result. The Court eradicated the confusion and inconsis-
tency rampant in the voir dire process of capital trials by providing a
bright-line rule for trial courts.188 This bright-line rule requires that a
"reverse-Witherspoon inquiry" be permitted when requested by the de-
fense.18 9 Accordingly, imposition of a sentence will be denied if even
one juror is empaneled who automatically would impose the death sen-
tence.190 Thus, the case is significant for championing the constitu-
tional rights of defendants in a manner that can be applied easily to
future criminal cases.191
This case also is significant because it rejected the dissent's argu-
ment that it is unnecessary for a potential juror to consider mitigating
factors to be impartial.' 92 The dissent stated that once guilt has been
established, it is perfectly legal for a juror to disregard mitigating evi-
183. See generally Dayan et al., supra note 5, at 165. Dayan noted that chal-
lenges for cause ensure impartiality because they "eliminate extremism and par-
tiality." Id.
184. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). For a discussion of Witherspoon, see
supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 725 (Del. 1990) (refusing defense
counsel's request to pose "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2840 (1991), and abrogated by Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992); State v.
Hyman, 281 S.E.2d 209, 211 (S.C. 1981) (permitting prosecution to ask "Wither-
spoon inquiry" but prohibiting defense counsel to ask "reverse-Witherspoon in-
quiry", cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122 (1982), and reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1132 (1982)
and overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. 1991), and
abrogated by Morgan v. Illinois 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992).
186. For a discussion of the inequality in the voir dire process, see supra
notes 105-28 and accompanying text.
187. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2233.
188. Id. at 2235.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. The Morgan Court created a bright-line rule that a trial court, when
requested by the defense, must ask a "reverse- Witherspoon inquiry." Id.
192. Id. at 2234. The Morgan Court stated:
Any juror who states that he or she will automatically vote for the
death penalty without regard to the mitigating evidence is announcing
an intention not to follow the instructions to consider the mitigating
evidence and to decide if it is sufficient to preclude imposition of the
death penalty. The statute plainly indicates that a lesser sentence is
available in every case where mitigating evidence exists; thus any juror
who would invariably impose the death penalty upon conviction cannot
be said to have reached this decision based on all the evidence. While
Justice Scalia chooses to argue that such a "merciless juror" is not a
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dence in his or her final decision.1 93 This reasoning is negated by case
law requiring exclusion of potential jurors who refuse to impose the death
penalty.' 94 According to the dissent's reasoning, ajuror who states dur-
ing voir dire that he or she will not consider aggravating factors and will
refuse to impose the death penalty is still an impartial juror.' 95 How-
ever, it is well established that a juror who will not consider the death
penalty is not impartial and must be excluded for cause.1 96 Thus, the
dissent's holding would perpetuate an unfair dichotomy between the
rights of the state and those of a criminal defendant.' 97 A juror who
would never consider imposing the death penalty upon a determination of
guilt would be excused as partial. 198 However, ajuror who would never
consider opposing the death penalty upon a determination of guilt would
be impartial.' 99 The Morgan majority refused to tip the scales of the
criminal justice system in favor of the state by permitting the state to
pose a "Witherspoon inquiry" while refusing to allow the defense to pose
a "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry."'200
The dissent also misconstrued the majority's characterization of a
capital juror's role in the sentencing phase. The Morgan majority did
not hold that jurors always must accept a mitigating factor presented in
the sentencing phase to be sufficient to lower the sentence. 20 1 Rather,
"lawless" one, he is in error, for such a juror will not give mitigating
evidence the consideration that the statute contemplates.
Id.
193. Id. at 2236-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (excluding jurors who
have substantial doubts about imposing the death penalty); Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois, 391 U.S. 510, 514-15 (1968) (excluding jurors who will not impose death
penalty).
195. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2240-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
"[t]he juror who says that he will always vote for the death penalty is not promis-
ing to be lawless, since there is not case in which is by law compelled to find a
mitigating fact 'sufficiently mitigating' ").
196. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21 (prospective juror must be "will-
ing to consider all of the penalties ... [and] not be irrevocably committed, before
the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts
and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings").
197. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting defend-
ant's argument that it is unfair to permit prosecution to pose "Witherspoon in-
quiry" but refuse to permit defense counsel to pose "reverse-Witherspoon
inquiry").
198. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "[a] juror who says he [or she]
will never vote for the death penalty, no matter what the facts, is saying that he
[or she] will not apply the law [which is] (the classic case of partiality)"); Wither-
spoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21 (excluding jurors who make it clear that they would
never impose death penalty).
199. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that merci-
less juror is not lawless juror).
200. Id. at 2234. The Court stated, "[a]nyjuror to whom mitigating factors
are irrelevant ... should be disqualified for cause." Id. at 2235.
201. Id. at 2229.
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the majority found that Illinois law simply requires ajuror to consider the
mitigating evidence and to consider whether the evidence is sufficient to
preclude the death penalty.20 2 By contrast, the dissent would find that a
juror under Illinois law does not have to conclude that any evidence is
mitigating nor consider the evidence, if presented. 203 The inconsistency
in the dissent's reasoning is illustrated by the following comparison:
(1) Following the majority's analysis, the law would provide: A
juror in the guilt phase of a trial who refuses even to consider
the evidence presented will fail to follow the law. Likewise, a
juror in the sentencing phase of a trial who refuses even to con-
sider the mitigating evidence presented fails to follow the law.
(2) Following the dissent's analysis, the law would provide: A
juror in the guilt phase of a trial who refuses even to consider
the evidence presented will fail to follow the law. However, a
juror in the sentencing phase of a trial who refuses even to con-
sider the mitigating evidence presented does not fail to follow
the law.
The language of the Illinois criminal statute directly contradicts the
dissent's approach. The Illinois criminal statute provides: "[t]he court
shall consider, or must instruct the jury to consider any aggravating and any
mitigating factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death pen-
alty." 20 4 The Morgan majority refused to ignore the plain language of
Illinois law and in so doing formulated a rule that is consistent with the
plain language.
While the Morgan Court attempted to equalize the rights of the state
and the criminal defendant, the Court did not go far enough. Although
the Morgan Court mandated exclusion of a juror who answers unequivo-
cally that he or she automatically will impose the death penalty, 20 5 the
Court failed to address the situation in which the juror admits a substan-
tial preference for imposition of the death penalty but does not state so
unequivocally. 20 6 Common sense indicates that a less equivocal re-
sponse is inevitably more common than a response that indicates ajuror
always will impose the death penalty.
The Morgan Court could have placed greater reliance on Wainwright
v. Wilt 20 7 and Adams v. Texas208 to decide this issue. These decisions
allowed judges to exclude jurors who had "substantial" doubts about
202. Id.
203. Id. at 2237.
204. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
205. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2234. The Court stated that "jurors are not im-
partial if they would automatically vote for the death penalty." Id.
206. Id. at 2233.
207. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
208. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
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imposing the death penalty.20 9 If the Morgan majority had provided spe-
cifically for exclusion of jurors who evidenced substantial doubts about
their ability to grant a life sentence, then the Court would have created
true equilibrium by excluding those with substantial doubts for and
against imposition of the death penalty. A more appropriate ground for
exclusion for cause should have been established under the Wainwright
and Adams formula 210 rather than the Witherspoon formula.2 11
V. IMPACT
The Supreme Court's decision in Morgan provides criminal defense
attorneys with a practical tool for uncovering juror bias and resolves ex-
isting confusion regarding the propriety of a "reverse-Witherspoon in-
quiry." 2 12 The Morgan Court created a bright-line rule that requires
courts to comply with defense counsels' requests to pose a "reverse-
Witherspoon inquiry."'213 This rule ensures that future defendants will
have a jury void ofjurors who believe that the death penalty is the only
appropriate punishment for a guilty capital defendant.2 14
However, Morgan does not ensure that a criminal defendant will
have a truly impartial jury.215 Trial courts still retain broad discretion if
a juror expresses substantial doubts about opposing the death pen-
209. See Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 (stating that standard for exclusion is
"whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the perform-
ance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath");
Adams, 448 U.S. at 45 (1980) (noting that "a juror may not be challenged for
cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in ac-
cordance with his instructions and his oath"). For a discussion of the difference
between the language in Witherspoon, which required a juror to state unequivo-
cally that he would oppose the death penalty, and the language in Adams and
Wainwright, which allowed exclusion of jurors whose views would substantially
impair their ability to follow the law, see supra notes 70-92 and accompanying
text.
210. For a discussion of Wainwright, see supra notes 81-92 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of Adams, see supra notes 77-80 and accompanying
text.
211. Witlerspoon, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (excluding jurors whose views make it
unmistakably clear that they could not impose death penalty under any circum-
stances). For a discussion of the facts and significance of Witherspoon, see supra
notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
212. For a discussion of the confusion caused by Wainwright, see supra notes
81-92 and accompanying text.
213. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2235 (stating that "[a] defendant on trial for his
life must be permitted on voir dire to ascertain whether his prospective jurors"
would automatically impose death).
214. Id. at 2229-30. The Morgan majority stated that "a capital defendant
may challenge for cause any prospective juror who believes that the death pen-
alty is the only appropriate punishment." Id.
215. For an in-depth discussion of why a jury selected under the Morgan
analysis may still be partial, see supra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
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alty.2 16 The Morgan Court did not specifically mandate exclusion of
such jurors. By contrast, both Wainwright and Adams required a trial
court to exclude a juror who has substantial doubts about imposing the
death penalty. 217 As a result, the prosecution still retains a slight advan-
tage. Despite this noted distinction, the Morgan Court did provide a
framework for ensuring a capital defendant's right to an impartial jury
and laid foundation for future litigation on the constitutional limits of
that right.2 18
Tracy A. Peterson
216. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,425-26 (1985) (noting "def-
erence must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror"); State v.
Atkins, 399 S.E.2d 760, 765 (S.C. 1990) ("The determination of whether ajuror
is qualified to serve on a death penalty case is within the sole discretion of the
trial judge." (quoting State v. Plemmons, 332 S.E.2d 765 (S.C. 1985), vacated on
other grounds, 476 U.S. 1102 (1986), and overruled on other grounds by State v. Tor-
rence, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1988))).
217. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 (recognizing that exclusion is appropriate
where juror indicates that his or her views would substantially impair his or her
performance as juror); Adams, 448 U.S. at 45 (stating that challenge for cause is
not appropriate unless juror's views would substantially impair his or her ability
to follow law).
218. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2233 (permitting defense counsel to request that
juror be asked "reverse-Witherspoon inquiry").
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